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Abstract:  
We extend the Consumption-based CAPM (C-CAPM) model for representative agents 
with different risk attitudes. We introduce the concept of expectation dependence and 
show that for a risk averse representative agent, it is the first-degree expectation 
dependence rather than the covariance that determines C-CAPM’s riskiness. We extend 
the assumption of risk aversion to prudence and provide a weaker dependence 
condition than first-degree expectation dependence to obtain the values of asset price 
and equity premium. Results are generalized to higher-degree risk changes and higher- 
order representative agents, and are linked to the equity premium puzzle. 
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1 Introduction
Consumption-based capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM), developed in Rubinstein (1976),
Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979) and Grossman and Shiller (1981), relates the risk premium on
each asset to the covariance between the asset return and the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution of a decision maker. The most important comparative statics results for C-CAPM
is how an asset’s price or equity premium changes as the quantity of risk and the price of
risk changes. The results of comparative statics analysis thus form the basis for much of our
understanding of the sources of changes in consumption (macroeconomic) risk and risk aversion
that drive asset prices and equity premia.
The two objectives of this study are to propose a new theoretical framework for C-CAPM and
to extend its comparative statics. We use general utility functions and probability distributions
to investigate C-CAPM. Our model provides insight into the basic concepts that determine asset
prices and equity premia.
The C-CAPM pricing rule is sometimes interpreted as implying that the price of an asset
with a random payoff falls short of its expected payoff if and only if the random payoff positively
correlates with consumption. Liu and Wang (2007) show that this interpretation of C-CAPM
is not generally correct by presenting a counterexample. We introduce more powerful statistical
tools to obtain the appropriate dependence between asset payoff and consumption. We first
discuss the concept of expectation dependence developed by Wright (1987) and Li (2010). We
show that, for a risk averse representative agent, it is the first-degree expectation dependence
between the asset’s payoff and consumption rather than the covariance that determines C-
CAPM’s riskiness. Our result also reinterprets the covariance between an asset’s payoff and the
marginal utility of consumption in terms of the expectation dependence between the payoff and
consumption itself. We extend the assumption of risk aversion to prudence and provide a weaker
dependence condition than first-degree expectation dependence. Finally, we interpret C-CAPM
in a general setting: for the ith-degree risk averse representative agent,1 with i = 2, .., N + 1, it
is the N th-order expectation dependence that determines C-CAPM’s riskiness.
1Risk aversion in the traditional sense of a concave utility function is indicated by i = 2, whereas i = 3 gives
downside risk aversion in the sense of Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980). ith-degree risk aversion is equivalent
to preferences satisfying risk apportionment of order i. See Ekern (1980) and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)
for more discussions.
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Our study relates to Gollier and Schlesinger (2002) who examine asset prices in a representative-
agent model of general equilibrium with two differences. First, we study asset price and equity
premium driven by macroeconomic risk as in the traditional C-CAPM model while Gollier and
Schlesinger’s model considers the relationship between the riskiness of the market portfolio and
its expected return. Second, Gollier and Schlesinger (2002)’s model is a static model whereas
our results rest on a dynamic framework.
Our study also extends the literature that examines the effects of higher-degree risk changes
on the macroeconomy. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) investigate necessary and sufficient
conditions on preferences for a higher-degree change in risk to increase saving. Our study
provides necessary and sufficient conditions on preferences for a higher-degree change in risk to
set asset price and equity premia.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces several concepts of dependence. Section
3 provides a reinterpretation of C-CAPM for risk averse representative agents. Section 4 extends
the results of Section 3 to prudent and higher-order risk averse agents respectively. Section 5
interprets the results in terms of the equity premium puzzle and concludes the paper.
2 Concepts of dependence
The concept of correlation coined by Galton (1886) had served as the only measure of depen-
dence during the first 70 years of the 20th century. However correlation is too weak to obtain
meaningful conclusions in many economic and financial applications. For example, covariance
is a poor tool for describing dependence for non-normal distributions. Since Lehmann’s intro-
duction of the concept of quadrant dependence in 1966, stronger measures of dependence have
received much attention in the statistical literature2.
Suppose x˜ × y˜ ∈ [a, b] × [d, e], where a, b, d and e are finite. Let F (x, y) denote the joint
and FX(x) and FY (y) the marginal distributions of x˜ and y˜. Lehmann (1966) introduces the
following concept to investigate positive dependence.
Definition 2.1 (Lehmann, 1966) (x˜, y˜) is positively quadrant dependent, written PQD(x˜, y˜), if
F (x, y) ≥ FX(x)FY (y) for all (x, y) ∈ [a, b]× [d, e]. (1)
2For surveys of the literature, we refer to Joe (1997), Mari and Kotz (2001) and Embrechts (2009).
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The above inequality can be rewritten as
FX(x|y˜ ≤ y) ≥ FX(x) (2)
and an interpretation of definition (2.1) is provided by Lehmann as follows: “knowledge of
y˜ being small increases the probability of x˜ being small”. PQD has its interest in modeling
dependent risks because it can take into account the simultaneous downside (upside) evolution
of risks. The marginal and the conditional CDFs can be changed simultaneously3 .
Wright (1987) introduced the following related concept of dependence into the economics
literature.
Definition 2.2 If
FED(x˜|y) = [Ex˜−E(x˜|y˜ ≤ y)] ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [d, e], (3)
and there is at least some y0 in some set S with prob(S) > 0, for which a strong
inequality holds, then x˜ is positive first− degree expectation dependent on y˜.
The family of all distributions F satisfying (3) will be denoted by F1. Similarly, x˜ is negative
first-degree expectation dependent on y˜ if (3) holds with the inequality sign reversed. The
totality of negative first-degree expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by G1.
Wright (1987, page 113) interprets negative first-degree expectation dependence as follows:
“when we discover y˜ is small, in the precise sense that we are given the truncation y˜ ≤ y, our
expectation of x˜ is revised upward”. Having x˜ positively (negatively) first-degree expectation
dependent on y˜ is a stronger condition than positive (negative) quadrant dependence between x˜
and y˜, but a weaker condition than correlation (see Wright (1987) and Li (2010) for discussions
of these concepts and examples).
Li (2010) proposes the following weaker dependence measure:
Definition 2.3 If
SED(x˜|y) =
∫ y
d
[Ex˜−E(x˜|y˜ ≤ t)]FY (t)dt (4)
=
∫ y
d
FED(x˜|t)FY (t)dt ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [d, e],
then x˜ is positive second-degree expectation dependent on y˜.
3Portfolio selection problems with positive quadrant dependency have been explored by Pellerey and Semeraro
(2005) and Dachraoui and Dionne (2007), among others.. Pellerey and Semeraro (2005) assert that a large subset
of the elliptical distributions class is PQD. For more examples, see Joe (1997).
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The family of all distributions F satisfying (4) will be denoted by F2. Similarly, x˜ is negative
second-degree expectation dependent on y˜ if (4) holds with the inequality sign reversed, and the
totality of negative second-degree expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by G2.
It is obvious that F1 ⊆ F2 and G1 ⊆ G2 but the converse is not true. Because x˜ and y˜ are
positively correlated when (see Lehmann 1966, lemma 2)
Cov(x˜, y˜) =
∫ b
a
∫ e
d
[F (x, y)− FX(x)FY (y)]dxdy =
∫ e
d
FED(x˜|t)FY (t)dt ≥ 0, (5)
then Cov(x˜, y˜) ≥ 0 is only a necessary condition for (x˜, y˜) ∈ F2 but the converse is not true.
Rewriting 1thED(x˜|y) = FED(x˜|y), 2thED(x˜|y) = SED(x˜|y) = ∫ yd FED(x˜|t)FY (t)dt, re-
peated integrals yield:
N thED(x˜|y) =
∫ y
d
(N − 1)thED(x˜|t)dt, for N ≥ 3. (6)
Definition 2.4 (Li 2010) If kthED(x˜|e) ≥ 0, for k = 2, ..., N − 1 and
N thED(x˜|y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [d, e], (7)
then x˜ is positive N th-order expectation dependent on y˜ (N thED(x˜|y)).
The family of all distributions F satisfying (7) will be denoted by FN . Similarly, x˜ is negative
N th-order expectation dependent on y˜ if (7) holds with the inequality sign reversed, and the
totality of negative N th-order expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by GN . From
this definition, we know that FN−1 ⊆ FN and GN−1 ⊆ GN but the converse is not true (See
Li (2010) for more details). For our purpose, comparative expectation dependence has to be
defined.
Sibuya (1960) introduces the concept of dependence function ΩF :
ΩF =
F (x, y)
FX(x)FY (y)
. (8)
We propose the following definition, which generalizes Sibuya’s (1960) definition, to quantify
comparative expectation dependence.
Definition 2.5 Define ithEDF and ithEDH , for i = 1, .., N , as the ith expectation depen-
dence under distribution F (x, y) and H(x, y) respectively. Distribution F (x, y) is more first-
degree expectation dependent than H(x, y), if FEDF (x˜|y)FY (y) ≥ FEDH(x˜|y)HY (y) for all
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y ∈ [d, e]. Distribution F (x, y) is more N th-order expectation dependent than H(x, y) for N ≥ 2,
if kthEDF (x˜|e) ≥ kthEDH(x˜|e), for k = 2, ..., N − 1 and
N thEDF (x˜|y) ≥ N thEDH(x˜|y) for all y ∈ [d, e]. (9)
When N = 1, F (x, y) is more first-degree expectation dependent than H(x, y) if
F (x, y)− FX(x)FY (y) ≤ H(x, y)−HX(x)HY (y). (10)
Hence ΩF ≤ ΩH is a sufficient condition for F (x, y) having more first-degree expectation depen-
dent than H(x, y).
3 C-CAPM for a risk averse representative agent
3.1 Consumption-based asset pricing model
The well known consumption-based asset pricing model can be expressed as the following two
equations (see e.g. Cochrane 2005, page 13-14)
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf
+ β
covt[u′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1]
u′(ct)
, (11)
and
EtR˜t+1 −Rf = −covt[u
′(c˜t+1), R˜t+1]
Etu′(c˜t+1)
(12)
where pt is the price in period t of an asset with random payoff x˜t+1 and gross return R˜t+1 in
period t+1, β is the subjective discount factor, Rf is the gross return of the risk-free asset, u′(·)
is the marginal utility function, ct is the consumption in period t, and c˜t+1 is the consumption
in period t+ 1. ER˜t+1 −Rf is the asset’s risk premium.
When the representative agent’s utility function is the power function, u(ct) =
c1−γt −1
1−γ where
γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and c˜t+1 and x˜t+1 are conditional lognormally dis-
tributed, (12) becomes (Campbell 2003, page 821)
Etr˜t+1 − rf + vart(r˜t+1)2 = γcovt(log c˜t+1, r˜t+1), (13)
where r˜t+1 = log(1 + R˜t+1) and rf = log(1 +Rf ).
The first term on the right-hand side of (11) is the standard discounted present-value formula.
This is the asset’s price for a risk-neutral representative agent or for a representative agent when
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asset payoff and consumption are independent. The second term is a risk aversion adjustment.
(11) states that an asset with random future payoff x˜t+1 is worth less than its expected payoff
discounted at the risk-free rate if and only if cov[u′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] ≤ 0. (12) shows that all assets
have an expected return equal to the risk-free rate plus a risk adjustment under risk aversion.
(13) states that the log risk premium is equal to the product of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion and the covariance of the log asset return with consumption growth. We now provide
a generalization of these results.
Suppose (x˜t+1, R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ [x, x] × [R,R] × [c, c]. From theorem 1 in Cuadras (2002), we
know that covariance can always be written as
covt[u′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] =
∫ x
x
∫ c
c
[F (ct+1, xt+1)− FCt+1(ct+1)FXt+1(xt+1)]u′′(ct+1)dxt+1dct+1. (14)
Because we can write∫ x
x
[FXt+1(xt+1|c˜t+1 ≤ ct+1)− FXt+1(xt+1)]dxt+1 = Ex˜t+1 −E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ ct+1), (15)
(see, e.g., Tesfatsion (1976), Lemma 1), hence, we have
covt[u′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] (16)
=
∫ c
c
[Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ ct+1)]FCt+1(ct+1)u′′(ct+1)dct+1 (by (15))
=
∫ c
c
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)u′′(ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)dct+1.
Using (16), (11) can be rewritten as
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted present value effect
−β
∫ c
c
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)[−
u′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]dct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
first−degree expectation dependence effect
(17)
=
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− β
∫ c
c
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)AR(ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1,
where AR(x) = −u′′(x)u′(x) is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient, andMRSx,y = u
′(x)
u′(y)
is the marginal rate of substitution between x and y. We can also rewrite (12) as
EtR˜t+1 −Rf =
∫ c
c
FED(R˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption risk effect
[− u
′′(ct+1)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
price of risk effect
dct+1 (18)
Because Rf = 1β
u′(ct)
Etu′(c˜t+1) (see e.g. Cochrane 2005, page 11), we also have
EtR˜t+1 −Rf = βRf
∫ c
c
FED(R˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)AR(ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1 (19)
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(17) shows that an asset’s price involves two terms. The effect, measured by the first term on
the right-hand side of (17), is the “discounted present value effect.” This effect depends on the
expected return of the asset and the risk-free interest rate. The sign of the discounted present
value effect is the same as the sign of the expected return. This term captures the “direct”
effect of the discounted expected return, which characterizes the asset’s price for a risk-neutral
representative agent.
The second term on the right-hand side of (17) is called “first-degree expectation depen-
dence effect.” This term involves β, the expectation dependence between the random payoff and
consumption, the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient and the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution. The sign of the first-degree expectation dependence indicates whether the move-
ments on consumption tend to reinforce (positive first-degree expectation dependence) or to
counteract (negative first-degree expectation dependence) the movements on an asset’s payoff.
(18) states that the expected excess return on any risky asset over the risk-free interest rate
can be explained as an integral of a number represented by the quantity of consumption risk
times the price of this risk. The quantity of consumption risk is measured by the first-degree
expectation dependence of the excess stock return with consumption, while the price of risk is
the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient times the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
We obtain the following proposition from (17) and (18).
Proposition 3.1 The following statements hold:
(i) pt ≤ Etx˜t+1Rf for any risk averse representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0) if and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈
F1;
(ii) pt ≥ Etx˜t+1Rf for any risk averse representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0) if and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈
G1;
(iii) EtR˜t+1 ≥ Rf for all risk averse representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0) if and only if (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈
F1;
(iv) EtR˜t+1 ≤ Rf for all risk averse representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0) if and only if (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈
G1.
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.1 states that, for a risk averse representative agent, an asset’s price is low-
ered (or equity premium is positive) if and only if its payoff is positively first-degree expec-
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tation dependent with consumption. Conversely, an asset’s price is raised (or equity pre-
mium is negative) if and only if its payoff is negatively first-degree expectation dependent
with consumption. Therefore, for a risk averse representative agent, it is the first-degree
expectation dependence rather than the covariance that determines its riskiness. Because
(x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F1(G1) ⇒ covt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ≥ 0(≤ 0) and the converse is not true, we conclude
that a positive (negative) covariance is only a necessary condition for risk averse agent paying a
lower (higher) asset price (or having a positive (negative) equity premium).
3.2 Comparative risk aversion
The assumption of risk aversion has long been a cornerstone of modern economics and finance.
Ross (1981) provides the following strong measure for comparative risk reversion:
Definition 3.2 (Ross 1981) u is more Ross risk averse than v if and only if there exists λ > 0
such that for all x, y
u′′(x)
v′′(x)
≥ λ ≥ u
′(y)
v′(y)
. (20)
More risk averse in the sense of Ross guarantees that the more risk averse decision-maker is
willing to pay more to benefit from a mean preserving contraction.
Under which condition does a change in the representative agent’s risk preferences reduce
the asset price? To answer this question let us consider a change of the utility function from u
to v. From (17) and (18), for agent v, we have
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− β
∫ c
c
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)[−
v′′(ct+1)
v′(ct)
]dct+1 (21)
and
EtR˜t+1 −Rf =
∫ c
c
FED(R˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)[−
v′′(ct+1)
Etv′(c˜t+1)
]dct+1. (22)
Intuition suggests that if asset return and consumption are positive dependent and agent u
is more risk averse than agent v, agent u should have a larger risk premium than agent v. This
intuition can be reinforced by Ross risk aversion and first-degree expectation dependence, as
stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 Let put and p
v
t denote the asset’s prices corresponding to u and v respectively.
The following statements hold:
(i) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F1 if and only if v is more Ross risk averse than u;
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(ii) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G1 if and only if u is more Ross risk averse than v;
(iii) u has a larger risk premium than agent v for all (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F1 if and only if u is
more Ross risk averse than v;
(iv) u has a larger risk premium than agent v for all (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G1 if and only if v is
more Ross risk averse than u.
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.3 indicates that, when an asset’s price first-degree positively (negatively) expec-
tation depends on consumption, an increase in risk aversion in the sense of Ross decreases (in-
creases) the asset price. Proposition 3.3 also shows that, for all risk averse representative agents,
assets whose gross returns are positively first-degree expectation dependent with consumption
must promise higher expected returns to induce agents to hold them. Conversely, assets that
negatively first-degree expectation depend on consumption, such as insurance, can offer expected
rates of return that are lower than the risk-free rate, or even negative (net) expected returns.
The results of Proposition 3.3 cannot be obtained with the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion
measure. We consider the convenient power utility form u(c) = c
1−γu−1
1−γu and v(c) =
c1−γv−1
1−γv . γu
and γv are u and v’s relative risk aversion coefficients respectively. Intuition would suggest that,
when an asset’s gross return and consumption are positively dependent, γu ≥ γv implies that u’s
risk premium will be higher. However, the following counter example shows that, in the range
of acceptable values of parameters, the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coefficient is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition to obtain higher risk premium when asset’s gross return
and consumption are positively first-degree expectation dependent.
Counter Example Suppose u(c) = c
1−γ−1
1−γ , c˜t+1 ∈ [1, 3] almost surely and (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F1
(note that in this case covt(R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ≥ 0), from (18) we obtain
EtR˜t+1 −Rf =
∫ c
c
FED(R˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)[−
u′′(ct+1)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
]dct+1 (23)
=
∫ c
c
FED(R˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)
γc−γ−1t+1
Etc˜
−γ
t+1
dct+1,
hence, when an asset’s gross return and consumption are positively first-degree expectation
dependent, d[EtR˜t+1−R
f ]
dγ ≥ 0 if and only if d
γc−γ−1t+1
Etc˜
−γ
t+1
/dγ ≥ 0. We now show that dγc
−γ−1
t+1
Etc˜
−γ
t+1
/dγ ≥ 0
is not always true because it contains the variations of the marginal rate of substitution. Because
d
γc−γ−1t+1
Etc˜
−γ
t+1
/dγ =
c−γ−1t+1
(Etc˜
−γ
t+1)2
{[1− γ(γ + 1)c−1t+1]Etc˜−γt+1 + γ2Etc˜−γ−1t+1 }, (24)
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we obtain d[EtR˜t+1−R
f ]
dγ ≥ 0 if and only if [1− γ(γ + 1)c−1t+1]Etc˜−γt+1 + γ2Etc˜−γ−1t+1 ≥ 0. Because
[1− γ(γ + 1)c−1t+1]Etc˜−γt+1 + γ2Etc˜−γ−1t+1 (25)
≤ [1− 1
3
γ(γ + 1)]Etc˜
−γ
t+1 + γ
2Etc˜
−γ−1
t+1 (since c˜t+1 ≤ 3 almost surely),
then for γ = 2 and c˜t+1 such that Etc˜
−γ
t+1 =
1
5 and Etc˜
−γ−1
t+1 =
1
21 , we have
[1− 1
3
γ(γ + 1)]Etc˜
−γ
t+1 + γ
2Etc˜
−γ−1
t+1 = −
1
5
+
4
21
< 0. (26)
Therefore, a higher Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coefficient is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition to obtain higher risk premium.
3.3 Changes in joint distributions
The question dual to the change in risk aversion examined above is as follows: Under which
condition does a change in the joint distribution of random payoff and consumption increase
the asset’s price? We may also ask the same question for the risk premium by using the joint
distribution of an asset’s gross return and consumption. To address these questions, let us denote
EHt and FEDH as the expectation and first order expectation dependency under distribution
H(x, y). Let pFt and p
H
t denote the corresponding prices under distributions F (x, y) and H(x, y)
respectively. From (17), we have
pHt =
EHt x˜t+1
Rf
− β
∫ c
c
FEDH(x˜t+1|ct+1)HCt+1(ct+1)[−
u′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]dct+1. (27)
Similarly, from (18) we have
EHt R˜t+1 −Rf =
∫ c
c
FEDH(R˜t+1|ct+1)HCt+1(ct+1)[−
u′′(ct+1)
EHt u
′(c˜t+1)
]dct+1. (28)
From (17), (18), (27) and (28), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.4 The following statements hold:
(i) Suppose EFt x˜t+1 = E
H
t x˜t+1, then p
F
t ≤ pHt for all risk averse representative agents if and
only if F (x, y) is more first-degree expectation dependent than H(x, y);
(ii) For all risk averse representative agents, F (x, y) is more first-degree expectation depen-
dent than H(x, y) if and only if the risk premium under F (x, y) is greater than under H(x, y).
Proof See Appendix A.
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Part (i) of Proposition 3.4 shows that a pure increase in first-degree expectation dependence
represents an increase in asset riskiness for all risk averse investors. The next corollary considers
a simultaneous variation in expected return.
Corollary 3.5 For all risk averse representative agents, EFt x˜t+1 ≤ EHt x˜t+1 and F (x, y) is more
first-degree expectation dependent than H(x, y) imply pFt ≤ pHt ;
Proof The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (17) and (27).
Corollary 3.5 states that, for all risk averse representative agents, a decrease in the expected re-
turn and the first-degree expectation dependence between return and consumption will decrease
the asset’s price. Again, the key available concept for prediction is comparative first-degree
expectation dependence.
4 C-CAPM for a higher-order risk averse representative agent
4.1 C-CAPM for a risk averse and prudent representative agent
The concept of prudence and its relationship to precautionary savings was introduced by Kimball
(1990). Since then, prudence has become a common and accepted assumption in the economics
literature (Gollier 2001). All prudent agents dislike any increase in downside risk in the sense
of Menezes et al. (1980) (See also Chiu, 2005.). Deck and Schlesinger (2010) provide a labora-
tory experiment to determine whether preferences are prudent and show behavioural evidence
for prudence. In this section, we will demonstrate that we can get weaker dependence condi-
tions for asset price and equity premium than first-degree expectation dependence, when the
representative agent is risk averse and prudent.
We can integrate the right-hand term of (16) by parts and obtain:
covt[u′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] =
∫ c
c
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)u′′(ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)dct+1 (29)
=
∫ c
c
u′′(ct+1)d(
∫ ct+1
c
[Ex˜t+1 −E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]FCt+1(s)ds)
= u′′(ct+1)
∫ ct+1
c
[Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]FCt+1(s)ds|cc
−
∫ c
c
∫ ct+1
c
Ex˜t+1 −E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]FCt+1(s)dsu′′′(ct+1)dct+1
= u′′(c)
∫ c
c
[Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]FCt+1(s)ds
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−
∫ c
c
∫ ct+1
c
Ex˜t+1 −E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]FCt+1(s)dsu′′′(ct+1)dct+1
= u′′(c)covt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1)−
∫ c
c
SED(x˜t+1|ct+1)u′′′(ct+1)dct+1.
From equation (5), we know that a positive SED implies a positive cov(x˜t+1, c˜t+1) but the
converse is not true. Hence, we have from (29) that covt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ≥ 0 is only a necessary
condition for covt[u′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] ≤ 0 for all u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0. With a positive SED function,
prudence is also necessary.
(11) and (12) can be rewritten as:
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted present value effect
−βcovt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1)[−u
′′(c)
u′(ct)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
covariance effect
(30)
− β
∫ c
c
SED(x˜t+1|ct+1)[u
′′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]dct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
second−degree expectation dependence effect
or
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− βcovt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1)AR(c)MRSc,ct (31)
−β
∫ c
c
SED(x˜t+1|ct+1)AP (ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1,
where AP (x) = u
′′′(x)
u′(x) is the index of absolute prudence
4, and
EtR˜t+1 −Rf (32)
= covt(R˜t+1, c˜t+1)[− u
′′(c)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption covariance effect
+
∫ c
c
SED(R˜t+1|ct+1) u
′′′(ct+1)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
dct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption second−degree expectation dependence effect
or
EtR˜t+1 −Rf (33)
= βRfcovt(R˜t+1, c˜t+1)AR(c)MRSc,ct + βR
f
∫ c
c
SED(R˜t+1|ct+1)AP (ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1.
Condition (31) includes three terms. The first one is the same as in condition (17). The second
term on the right-hand side of (31) is called the “covariance effect.” This term involves β, the
covariance of asset return and consumption, the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient and the
marginal rates of substitution. The third term on the right-hand side of (31) is called “second-
degree expectation dependence effect,” which reflects the way in which second-degree expectation
4Modica and Scarsini (2005), Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010) propose u
′′′(x)
u′(x)
instead of −u′′′(x)
u′′(x) (Kimball, 1990) as an alternative candidate to evaluate the intensity of prudence.
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dependence of risk affects asset’s price through the intensity of downside risk aversion. Again
(31) affirms that positive correlation is only a necessary condition for all risk averse and prudent
agents to pay a lower price. Equation (32) shows that a positive SED reinforces the positive
covariance effect to obtain a positive risk premium.
We state the following propositions without proof (The proofs of these propositions are
similar to the proofs of Propositions in Section 3, and are therefore skipped. They are however
available from the authors.).
Proposition 4.1 The following statements hold:
(i) pt ≤ Etx˜t+1Rf for any risk averse and prudent representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0) if
and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F2;
(ii) pt ≥ Etx˜t+1Rf for any risk averse and prudent representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0) if
and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G2;
(iii) EtR˜t+1 ≥ Rf for all risk averse and prudent representative agents (u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0)
if and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F2;
(iv) EtR˜t+1 ≤ Rf for all risk averse and prudent representative agents (u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0)
if and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G2.
Modica and Scarsini (2005) provide a comparative statics criterion for downside risk in the
spirit of Ross (1981).
Definition 4.2 (Modica and Scarsini 2005) u is more downside risk averse than v if and only
if there exists λ > 0 such that for all x, y
u′′′(x)
v′′′(x)
≥ λ ≥ u
′(y)
v′(y)
. (34)
More downside risk aversion can guarantee that the decision-maker with a utility function that
has more downside risk aversion is willing to pay more to avoid the downside risk increase as
defined by Menezes et al. (1980). We can therefore extend Proposition 3.3 as follows:
Proposition 4.3 The following statements hold:
(i) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F2 if and only if v is more Ross and downside risk averse
than u;
(ii) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G2 if and only if u is more Ross and downside risk averse
than v;
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(iii) u has a larger risk premium than agent v for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F2 if and only if u is
more Ross and downside risk averse than v;
(iv) u has a larger risk premium than agent v for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G2 if and only if v is
more Ross and downside risk averse than u.
We also obtain the following results for changes in joint distributions.
Proposition 4.4 The following statements hold:
(i) Suppose EFt x˜t+1 = E
H
t x˜t+1, then p
F
t ≤ pHt for all risk averse and prudent representative
agents if and only if F (x, y) is more second-degree expectation dependent than H(x, y);
(ii) For all risk averse and prudent representative agents, F (x, y) is more second-degree
expectation dependent than H(x, y) if and only if the risk premium under F (x, y) is greater than
under H(x, y).
Corollary 4.5 For all risk averse and prudent representative agents, EFt x˜t+1 ≤ EHt x˜t+1 and
F (x, y) is more second-degree expectation dependent than H(x, y) implies pFt ≤ pHt ;
4.2 C-CAPM for a higher-order representative agent
Ekern (1980) provides the following definition to sign the higher-order risk attitude.
Definition 4.6 (Ekern 1980) An agent u is N th degree risk averse, if and only if
(−1)Nu(N)(x) ≤ 0 for all x, (35)
where u(N)(·) denotes the N th derivative of u(x).
Ekern (1980) shows that all agents having utility function with N th degree risk aversion dislike
a probability change if and only if it produces an increase in N th degree risk. Risk aversion
in the traditional sense of a concave utility function is indicated by N = 2. When N = 3, we
obtain u′′′ ≥ 0 which means that marginal utility is convex, or implies prudence. Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006) derive a class of lottery pairs to show that lottery preferences are compatible
with Ekern’s N th degree risk aversion.
Jindapon and Neilson (2007) generalize Ross’ risk aversion to higher-order risk aversion.
Definition 4.7 (Jindapon and Neilson 2007) u is more N th-degree Ross risk averse than v if
and only if there exists λ > 0 such that for all x, y
u(N)(x)
v(N)(x)
≥ λ ≥ u
′(y)
v′(y)
. (36)
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Li (2009) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010) provide context-free explanations for higher-order
Ross risk aversion. In Appendix B, we generalize the results of section 3 and 4.1 to higher-degree
risks and higher order representative agents.
5 Concluding remarks on the equity premium puzzle
We discuss the implications of our results on the equity premium puzzle. The major discrepancy
between the C-CAPMmodel predictions and empirical reality is identified as the equity premium
puzzle in the literature. As mentioned in Section 3, the key empirical observations of the equity
premium puzzle based on (13) can be summarized as follows:
When the representative agent’s utility function is the power function, and c˜t+1 and x˜t+1
are conditional lognormally distributed, observed equity premium can be explained only by
assuming a very high coefficient of relative risk aversion. In other words, it is difficult to explain
the existence of observed high risk premia with the covariance because of the smoothness of
consumption over time. However, the equity premium puzzle conclusion is built on specific
utility functions and return distributions. Our results show that, for general utility functions
and distributions, covariance is not the key element of equity premium prediction. It is very
easy to find counter intuitive results. For example, given positively correlated gross return and
consumption distributions, a lower coefficient of relative risk aversion may result in higher equity
premium. Alternatively, given representative agent’s preference, a lower covariance between
gross return and consumption may result in a higher equity premium. Therefore, (13) is not a
robust theoretical prediction of equity premia.
Our results prove that asset pricing and equity premium settings and their comparative
statics imply the following robust predictions:
(a) it is expectation dependence between gross return and consumption that determines asset
riskiness rather than covariance;
(b) when gross return and consumption are positive expectation dependent, higher risk
aversion in the sense of Ross is equivalent to a higher equity premium;
(c) when a representative agent’s risk preference satisfies higher-order risk aversion, more
expectation dependence between gross return and consumption is equivalent to higher equity
premium.
Because the comparative Ross risk aversion is fairly restrictive upon preference, some readers
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may regard (b) as negative, because no standard utility functions satisfy such condition on the
whole domain. However, there are utility functions satisfying comparative Ross risk aversion
on some domain. For example, Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt
(2010) assert that (−1)N+1 u(N)u′ is an appropriate local index of N th order risk attitude. On
the other hand, some readers may think that the fact that no standard utility functions satisfy
these conditions would underscore the need to develop experimental methods to identify these
conditions. Ross (1981), Modica and Scarsini (2005), Li (2009) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt
(2010) provide context-free experiments for comparative Ross risk aversion. More research is
needed in both directions to develop the theoretical foundations for C-CAPM. This paper takes
a first step in that direction. We have proposed a new unified interpretation to C-CAPM, which
we have related to the equity premium puzzle problem. Our results are important because C-
CAPM shares the positive versus normative tensions that are present in finance and economics
to explain asset prices and equity premia.
6 Appendix A: Proofs of propositions
6.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
(i): The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (17) and (18). We prove the necessity
by a contradiction. Suppose that FED(x˜t+1|ct+1) < 0 for c0t+1. Because of the continuity of
FED(x˜|y), we have FED(x˜t+1|c0t+1) < 0 in interval [a,b]. Choose the following utility function:
u¯(x) =

αx− e−a x < a
αx− e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
αx− e−b x > b,
(37)
where α > 0. Then
u¯′(x) =

α x < a
α+ e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
α x > b
(38)
and
u¯′′(x) =

0 x < a
−e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
0 x > b.
(39)
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Therefore,
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− β 1
u′(ct)
∫ b
a
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)e−ct+1dct+1 >
Etx˜t+1
Rf
. (40)
This is a contradiction.
(ii) (iii) and (iv): We can prove them by the same approach used in (i).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3
(i): The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (17), (18), (21) and (22). We prove the
necessity by a contradiction. Suppose that there exists some ct+1 and ct such that
u′′(ct+1)
v′′(ct+1) >
u′(ct)
v′(ct) . Because u
′, v′, u′′ and v′′ are continuous, we have
u′′(ct+1)
v′′(ct+1)
>
u′(ct)
v′(ct)
for all (ct+1, ct) ∈ [γ1, γ2], (41)
hence
−u′′(ct+1)
−v′′(ct+1) >
u′(ct)
v′(ct)
for all (ct+1, ct) ∈ [γ1, γ2], (42)
and
−u
′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
> −v
′′(ct+1)
v′(ct)
for all (ct+1, ct) ∈ [γ1, γ2]. (43)
If F (x, y) is a distribution function such that FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FY (y) is strictly positive on interval
[γ1, γ2] and is equal to zero on other intervals, then we have
put − pvt = β
∫ γ2
γ1
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FY (y)[u
′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
− v
′′(ct+1)
v′(ct)
] < 0. (44)
This is a contradiction.
(ii) (iii) and (iv): We can prove them by the same approach used in (i).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4
(i): The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (17), (18), (27) and (28). We prove the
necessity by a contradiction. Suppose FEDF (x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1) < FEDH(x˜t+1|ct+1)HCt+1(ct+1)
for c0t+1. Owing the continuity of FEDF (x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)−FEDH(x˜t+1|ct+1)HCt+1(ct+1),
we have FEDF (x˜t+1|c0t+1)FCt+1(c0t+1) < FEDH(x˜t+1|c0t+1)HCt+1(c0t+1) in interval [a,b]. Choose
the following utility function:
u¯(x) =

αx− e−a x < a
αx− e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
αx− e−b x > b,
(45)
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where α > 0. Then
u¯′(x) =

α x < a
α+ e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
α x > b
(46)
and
u¯′′(x) =

0 x < a
−e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
0 x > b.
(47)
Therefore,
pFt − pHt (48)
= β
1
u′(ct)
∫ b
a
[FEDH(x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)− FEDF (x˜t+1|y)FCt+1(ct+1)]e−ct+1dct+1 > 0.
(ii): We can prove the second part of the proposition by the same approach used in (i).
7 Appendix B: Higher-order risks and higher order representa-
tive agents
We integrate the right-hand term of (16) by parts repeatedly until we obtain:
cov[u′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] =
N∑
k=2
(−1)ku(k)(c)kthED(x˜t+1|c) (49)
+
∫ c
c
(−1)N+1u(N+1)(ct+1)N thED(x˜t+1|ct+1)dct+1, for n ≥ 2.
Then (11) and (12) can be rewritten as:
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted present value effect
−β
N∑
k=2
kthED(x˜t+1|c)[(−1)k+1u
(k)(c)
u′(ct)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
higher−order cross moments effect
(50)
−β
∫ c
c
N thED(x˜t+1|ct+1)[(−1)N+2u
(N+1)(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]dct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nth−order expectation dependence effect
=
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− β
N∑
k=2
kthED(x˜t+1|c)AR(k)(c)MRSc,ct
−β
∫ c
c
N thED(x˜t+1|ct+1)AR(k+1)(ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1
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where AR(k)(x) = (−1)k+1 u(k)(x)u′(x) is the absolute index of kth order risk aversion, and
EtR˜t+1 −Rf (51)
=
N∑
k=2
kthED(R˜t+1|c)[(−1)k+1 u
(k)(c)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption cross moments effect
+
∫ c
c
N thED(R˜t+1|ct+1)[(−1)N+2u
(N+1)(ct+1)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nth degree expectation dependence effect
dct+1
= βRf
N∑
k=2
kthED(R˜t+1|c)AR(k)(c)MRSc,ct
+βRf
∫ c
c
N thED(R˜t+1|ct+1)AR(k+1)(ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1.
Condition (50) includes three terms. The first one is the same as in condition (17). The second
term on the right-hand side of (50) is called “higher-order cross moments effect.” This term
involves β, the intensity of higher-order risk aversion, the marginal rates of substitution and the
higher-order cross moments of asset return and consumption. The third term on the right-hand
side of (50) is called “N th − degree expectation dependence effect,” which reflects the way in
which N th-degree expectation dependence of risks affect asset price through the intensity of
absolute N th risk aversion and the marginal rates of substitution.
We state the following propositions without proof (The proofs of these propositions are
similar to the proofs of Propositions in Section 3, and are therefore skipped. They are however
available from the authors.).
Proposition 7.1 The following statements hold:
(i) pt ≤ Etx˜t+1Rf for any ith risk averse representative agent with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and only
if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ FN ;
(ii) pt ≥ Etx˜t+1Rf for any ith risk averse representative agent with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and only
if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ GN ;
(iii) EtR˜t+1 ≥ Rf for all ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and
only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ FN ;
(iv) EtR˜t+1 ≤ Rf for all ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and
only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ GN .
Proposition 7.1 suggests that, for a ith-degree risk averse representative agent with i = 1, .., n =
1, an asset’s price is lowered if and only if its payoff N th-order positively expectation depends
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on consumption. Conversely, an asset’s price is raised if and only if it N th-order negatively
expectation depends on consumption. Therefore, for ith-degree representative agents with i =
1, .., N + 1, it is the N th-order expectation dependence that determines its riskiness. The next
two propositions and Corollary 7.4 have a similar general intuition when compared with those
in Section 3.
Proposition 7.2 The following statements hold:
(i) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ FN if and only if v is more ith risk averse than u for
i = 2, ..., N + 1;
(ii) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ GN if and only if u is more ith risk averse than v for
i = 2, ..., N + 1;
(iii) u has a larger risk premium than agent v for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ FN if and only if u is
more Ross ith risk averse than v for i = 2, ..., N + 1;
(iv) u has a larger risk premium than agent v for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ GN if and only if v is
Ross ith risk averse than v for i = 2, ..., N + 1.
Proposition 7.3 The following statements hold:
(i) Suppose EFt x˜t+1 = E
H
t x˜t+1, then p
F
t ≤ pHt for all ith risk averse representative agents
with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and only if F (x, y) is N th more expectation dependent than H(x, y);
(ii) For all ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1,, F (x, y) is more ith-
degree expectation dependent than H(x, y) if and only if the risk premium under F (x, y) is greater
than H(x, y).
Corollary 7.4 For all ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1, EFt x˜t+1 ≤
EHt x˜t+1 and F (x, y) is more N
th expectation dependent than H(x, y) implies pFt ≤ pHt ;
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